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SOCIOLOGY: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS RELATIONS' 
I 
DEFINITIONS OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIETY 
PROFESSOR CHARLES A. ELLWOOD 
University of Missouri 
Definitions of sociology.-As sociology is a new science and 
has not yet received a definite form, it is not to be wondered at 
that there are a number of different conceptions of the science 
and no universal agreement as to its definition. While this dis- 
agreement among sociologists themselves as to the conception 
and definition of their science is now far less than formerly, 
still it is necessary to point out to the student at the outset the 
existing conflict of opinion. Through comparison of definitions 
more or less faulty, moreover, we may hope to reach an approxi- 
mately correct' definition. Of course no ultimate definition of 
sociology will be attempted, as that can only be formulated 
when the final stages of the development of the science have 
been reached. We are concerned only with the working or tenta- 
tive definition, such as every scientific worker must have in order 
to delimit his problems clearly from those of other sciences. 
There are at least six leading conceptions or definitions of 
sociology: 
i. Perhaps the most common conception of sociology 
is that it is a science which treats of social evils and their 
remedies. This is indeed the popular conception of the science, 
but it has few or no supporters among sociologists themselves. 
Sociology deals with the normal rather than the abnormal in 
the social life. It is true that sociology deals to some extent 
with so,cial evils, but it deals with them as incidents in normal 
social evolution rather than as its specific problems. Again this 
definition is open to criticism in that it confounds sociology with 
'This paper constitutes the first four chapters of a text in sociology which 
Professor Ellwood has in preparation.-EDITOR. 
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scientific philanthropy, which is an applied science resting upon 
sociology and other social sciences. This conception of sociology 
must, accordingly, be pronounced erroneous. 
2. A second definition of sociology which is often heard is 
that it is the science of society or of social phenomena. This 
conception of sociology is current among many scientific men, 
but it must be criticized as too broad and too vague. There are 
other sciences of society or of social phenomena than sociology. 
Economics and politics deal not less truly with social phenomena 
than sociology. If "the scientific treatment of any social phe- 
nomenon" is sociology, as an eminent authority has recently 
declared,2 then it is difficult to see how there is any place left for 
the special social sciences. It would be difficult to see, for 
example, why the scientific treatment of trade and markets 
would not fall within the scope of sociology, rather than of 
economics. Such a definition would make sociology include all 
the special social sciences; it would make it, in effect, but a name 
for the totality or encyclopedia of the social sciences. In any 
case it is too vague to satisfy the requirements of a working- 
definition of a science. It may be noted in passing, however, that 
there is no objection to using sociology as an encyclopedic term 
for all the social sciences in some connections, such as classifica- 
tions of the sciences, library classifications, philosophic sum- 
maries of knowledge, and the like. 
3. Another definition of sociology is that it is the science of 
the phenomena of sociability. This definition has grown out of 
a narrow interpretation of the word "social" as used in the 
definition last given. It is evident that if the second definition 
is much too broad, this latter is much too narrow. The sympa- 
thetic or altruistic phenomena of society which are brought to- 
gether under the term "sociability," though very important, are 
only one aspect of our social life. A science which treats of the 
phenomena of sociability could not be a general science of society, 
but only another special social science, co-ordinate with such 
sciences as economics and politics. Such a definition of sociology 
is usually not found explicitly stated in sociological texts, but 
2Westermarck, Amnerican Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, p. 684. 
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it is often implicit in sociological theories, and needs to be noted 
as a type of definition of sociology. 
4. A fourth type of definition of sociology is that which 
makes it "the science of human institutions." Under this head 
must be included Professor Ward's conception of sociology as 
"the science of human achievement," 3 although he uses achieve- 
ment in a somewhat wider sense than the word "institutions" is 
generally used. While this definition indicates many of the 
most important problems which the sociologist investigates, and 
so in a general way marks off the field of sociology, yet it is open 
to criticism as being at once too broad and too narrow. It is too 
broad, because the special social sciences also deal with human 
institutions, though in a specific rather than in a general way. 
Thus politics deals with the origin, development, and workings 
of political institutions. But the chief objection to this definition 
of sociology is that it is too narrow. It leaves out of account 
all the ephemeral and transitory phenomena of society, such as 
mobs, crazes, fads, fashions, and crimes, all of which are impor- 
tant phenomena for the sociologist to understand.4 Moreover, 
it leaves out of consideration also the many instinctive activities 
connected with nutrition, reproduction, and defense against 
enemies, which human societies exhibit in common with animal 
societies, and which constitute no inconsiderable part of the 
everyday social life of a people. 
5. A fifth type of definition of sociology is that which makes 
it the science of the order or organization of society. Under this 
class comes Professor Simmel's definition of sociology as "the 
science of the forms or modes of association." 5 To this type 
also belong such definitions as "sociology is the science of 
social relations ;" for in this case the problem emphasized 
is that of the organization of society. Now the problems 
of the organization of society, of the relations of individuals 
to one another in the social order, are undoubtedly among 
the most important problems of sociology; and much of the 
best sociological literature of the present is occupied with the 
3Ward, Pure Sociology, p. I 5. 
4See Ross, The Foundations of Sociology, p. 5. 
6 See American Journal of Sociology, Vol. II, p. I67. 
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discussion of these problems. This definition is good, then, as 
far as it goes; but modern science no longer throws the emphasis 
upon the static aspect of things, but rather upon change, develop- 
ment, evolution. A definition olf sociology, accordingly, which 
makes it the science of social organization, is open to the objec- 
tion that it neglects the most important problems oif sociology, 
namely, the problems of social evolution. 
6. A working definition of sociology may, then, be tentatively 
formulated as follows: Sociology is the science of the organtza- 
tion and evolution of society. This definition has the advantage 
of indicating at once the problems with which the sociologist 
deals, namely, problems of the organization, or order, of society, 
on the one hand, and problems of the evolution, or progress, of 
society, on the other. It meets, therefore, the requirements of a 
working definition of our science, in that it clearly delimits the 
problems of sociology from the problems of related sciences. It 
is worthy of note that this definition is very nearly that which 
Auguste Comte, the father of modern sociology, proposed, 
namely, "the science of the order and progress of society." 6 The 
words "organization" and "evolution" are, however, broader 
terms than "order" and "progress," and are therefore preferable. 
"Order" connotes a stable, settled, and harmonious condition of 
the elements of society; while "organization" means any arrange- 
ment of the parts of society with reference to each other. Social 
organization is practically synonymous with social structure. 
"Progress" means advancement, change for the better; while 
"evolution" in the broad sense in which it is here used, compre- 
hends change of every sort, whether foir the better or the worse.7 
I Positive Philosophy, Book VI, chap. iii. 
O of course, many other correct definitions of sociology might be formulated. 
The above definition we adopt simply because it serves to delimit clearly the 
problems of sociology from those of nearly allied sciences. As examples of others 
equally correct might be cited Professor Giddings' definition (Principles of 
Sociolgy, p. 5): "Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, 
structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psy- 
chical causes working together in a process of evolution ;" and also Professor 
Small's definition (General Sociology, p. 35): "Sociology is the science of the 
social process"-provided, of course, that we understand by "the social process" 
the whole process of social growth, development, and interaction, not one aspect 
of the process, such as the economic. 
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Definitions of society.-Our definition of sociology is still very 
far from clear until we define society. Unfortunately the con- 
ceptions of society are as varied as the conceptions of sociology. 
Indeed, it may be doubted whether the word "society" is capable 
of exact scientific definition.8 In defining it, there is all the 
difficulty of giving a loose popular term, which is continually 
shifting in its meaning a definite scientific content. The real 
fact which the sociologist is trying to get at is better expressed 
by the word "association." Our use of the word "society" in 
the definition of sociology is, therefore, merely provisional. But 
in the historical development of sociology the word has been 
used, and it seems best to continue its usage on that account, 
pointing out to the student its varied meanings in sociological 
literature. We must note the chief of these: 
i. A majority of the older sociologists used the word society 
as practically synonymous with the word nation. A society in 
their minds was "a body of people politically organized into an 
independent government," i. e., a nation. These sociologists 
have been called, not inaptly, "the national sociologists." No 
sociologist of the present would defend such a confusion of 
terms as this must be admitted to be. But the nation, as the 
most imposing social structure, legitimately occupies a central 
place in the sociologist's thought. 
2. Another definition of society, proposed by those who have 
seen the impossibility of limiting the concept of society to the 
national group, is that "a society is all that group of people that 
have a common civilization," or "who are the bearers of a cer- 
tain type of culture." A society, according to this conception, 
might be much more extensive than a nation, but could hardly 
be smaller. But if the confusing of society with the nation 
must be criticized as unduly limiting the concept of society and 
the work of the sociologist, much more must the confusing of 
society with the cultural group be criticized for the same reason. 
Such an arbitrary limitation upon the meaning of a term could 
scarcely be justified upon grounds of scientific necessity. It 
would be far better to take the term society with all the breadth 
8See Small, General Sociology, pp. I83, I84. 
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and variety of meaning which popular usage has given it, and 
try to give it a scientific content by finding a common element 
in its varying usages. All recent attempts at the definition of 
society have been directed to this end. 
3. As an example of such definition we might cite the defi- 
nition of society proposed by Professor Fairbanks: "Any group 
of men who are bound together in relations more or less perma- 
nent." 9 This is substantially a correct definition of the term 
society as it is used in a concrete sense by most sociologists of 
today. It is, however, somewhat vague as to what sort of rela- 
tions constitute a society. It fails to specify that these relations 
are not those of mere contiguity in time and space, but are those 
of psychical interaction. 
4. Any group of interacting individuals, we may say roughly, 
then, constitutes a society. But this definition must be qualified 
in at least two respects to give it scientific precision. In the first 
place we do not usually speak of individuals of different species 
as constituting a society. We regard a society as made up of 
individuals of the same species; and this limitation of the con- 
cept is convenient, and even necessary from a scientific point of 
view. To this extent Professor Giddings is undoubtedly right 
in insisting that similarity, resemblance, both physical and psy- 
chical, is the basis of society.10 Without at least the amount of 
resemblance which is found among individuals of the same 
species, society, in the scientific meaning of the word, is im- 
possible. When we speak of individuals as the constituent units 
of society, therefore, we assume that they are individuals of the 
same species. 
In the -second place we do not think of the individuals of a 
group as constituting a society unless they are psychically inter- 
dependent. Mere physiological interdependence is not sufficient 
to constitute a society. Whell we speak of groups of plants or 
other low organisms as constituting "societies" it is probable that 
we are using the term metaphorically, or else attributing to them 
some degree of psychic life. If we accept these two qualifications 
9 Fairbanks, Introduction to Sociology, p. 3. 
10 Giddings, Elements of Sociology, chaps. i, vi, and vii. 
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a correct definition of society in the concrete sense would be any 
group of psychically interacting individuals of the same species. 
It may be asked if another qualification should not be added 
to our definition, namely, that the individuals of the group be 
friendly disposed toward one another. But it is evident that 
hostility may exist among the members of a group and that it 
may be but a phase of their social life. Indeed, conflict between 
individuals usually arises because of their social relations 
(psychical interactions), not because they are socially unrelated. 
The concept of society cannot, then, be regarded as implying 
exclusively friendly relations. However, the prevailing rela- 
tions between the members of a group are friendly, and conflict 
may be regarded as a sort of negative and destructive element 
in the total life of the group. Practically, therefore, the internal 
conflicts of a group may be disregarded in a constructive view of 
its life-history. Ultimately all the members of a group work 
together in the carrying-on of a common life-process. In this 
sense they may be said to co-operate. If we mean by co-operation 
nothing more than this living together and working together in 
a common life, we shall be substantially correct if we define 
society as any grouip of individuals who either unconsciously 
(instinctively) or consciously (reflectively) co-operate." 
Thus a society may be constituted as readily by two or three 
individuals as by a million. The only criterion by which we may 
decide whether any group constitutes a society or not is its posses- 
sion or non-possession of the essential mark of a society, namely, 
the functional interdependence of its members on the psychical 
side. According to this view a family and a nation, a debating 
club and a civilization, are equally entitled to the appellation of 
society, and to be objects of the sociologist's investigation. As 
Stuckenberg has put it, 
Society is created whenever men pass from isolation to a relation of 
co-operation or antagonism, of mutuality and reciprocity; whenever they 
affect each other as stimuli ..... Society [is] constituted by the mental 
interaction of individuals, that is the essential idea.' 
''Compare Professor Giddings' definition of animal society in his Inductive 
Sociology, p. 5. 
'Z The first writer to define society as essentially an interaction of individuals 
(and so as a process), so far as I can discover, was Professor Simmel, of the 
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It is evident that society is but a broad term standing for the 
psychical interactions of individuals. It is practically a verbal 
noun, that is, it is the name of a process, and but little narrower 
than the abstract term "association." When used abstractly, 
indeed, it is synonymous with this latter term, meaning the inter- 
action of individuals. It is frequently convenient to use the word 
society in an abstract sense and when so used in this book it will 
mean "the reciprocal interactions of individuals." Substituting 
this phrase in our definition of sociology we get the following: 
Sociology is the science of the organization and evoluttion of the 
reciprocal interactions of individuals. 
Even this definition, the reader must be warned, like all formal 
definitions, falls far short of presenting an adequate conception 
of sociology. Such a conception we hope, however, can be gained 
from a perusal of the following pages. We hope to show that 
what the sociologist is interested in is not so much the organiza- 
tions and institutions of society as the associational processes 
which lie back of these, the processes of individual interaction 
which constitute them ;"3 and that sociology, in seeking such a 
fundamental view of the social life, necessarily becomes a biology 
and psychology of these associational processes. 
Definition of social.-Much confusion has been introduced into 
sociological discussions through the lax use of the word "social." 
The same writer not infrequently uses it in three or four different 
senses, shifting from one meaning to another without warning 
to the reader. Of course, when this adjective is properly used, 
it should correspond in meaning to the word society, signifying, 
"of, pertaining to, relating to, society." In accordance with our 
definition of society, therefore, the word social means "that 
which relates to, pertains to, the interactions of individuals." In 
other words, the social is that which involves the interaction of 
University of Berlin (see his Sociale Differenzierung, pp. I2-20). In the work of 
Stuckenberg from which the above quotation was taken (Sociology: The Science 
of Hueman Society) the idea is expanded through several pages (Vol. I, pp. 
80-I02). Professor Small (General Sociology, chap. i) and Professor Hayes 
(American Joutrnal of Sociology, Vol. X, pp. 750-765) have so developed and 
emphasized this idea that it must now be regarded as a postulate for sociology. 
1 See Professor Hayes's article on "Sociology a Study of Processes," 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, pp. 750-765. 
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two or mnore individuals. Social phenomena are, accordingly, as 
Professor Ross says in effect, "all phenomena which we cannot 
explain without bringing in the action of one individual upon 
another."14 
"Social," then, is a comprehensive term including the eco- 
nomic, political, moral, religious, educational, and other phe- 
nomena arising from the interactions of individuals. The 
economic, political, etc., is not to be distinguished from the 
social, save as one aspect or phase of the social. Economic and 
political problems, for example, are at the same time social prob- 
lems; but not all social problems are economic or political prob- 
lems. Social problems are economic, political, moral, religious, 
educational, etc., problems or problems which involve several or 
all of these aspects of the social life-problems, in other words, 
which are wider and deeper than any single phase of society. 
It is this latter class of problems which particularly deserve to be 
spoken of as sociological problems; but these we shall discuss 
later. 
Unfortunately the word social is not used popularly in the 
strict scientific way in which we have defined it, but is used with 
a variety of loose meanings attached to it. It is especially used 
as nearly synonymous with the word "sociable." The scientific 
student of society, however, has little excuse for using the word 
in a loose sense. He can always find some other word, or make 
use of some qualifying phrase, when it is necessary to express a 
narrower idea than that which logically attaches itself to the 
word "social" from its connection with the term "society." 15 
Anicmal societies.-It will be noticed that in the definitions 
of sociology, society, and social, we have avoided the use of the 
words "man," "human being," "humanity," and the like. This 
is because there are animal groups from which we cannot well 
14 Foundations of Sociology, p. 7. 
15 Because of the narrow meaning often given to the word "social," several 
writers have proposed other adj ectives, such as "societal" and "societary," to 
mean "of, or pertaining to, society." But there is no good reason why the word 
"social" should not be given in the social sciences this broad meaning, which, 
as we have already said, logically attaches to it; and such is rapidly becoming the 
best scientific usage. 
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withhold the name of "societies," because they have all the 
characteristics of societies as we have described them. Such, for 
example, are the groups formed by the so-called "social insects," 
the ants, bees, and wasps, and the groups formed by many birds 
and mammals. Objectively and even subjectively, so far.as we 
can see, these groups conform to the definition of society which 
we have accepted. While there are vast differences between 
these animal societies and human societies, these differences are 
specific, and not generic. The theory of evolution has broken 
down the wall which so long separated the human from the 
animal world, and no longer permits us to regard human nature 
and human inter-relations as something altogether peculiar and 
isolated. It is, in fact, impossible to define society in such a way 
as to include all human groups and only human groups, with- 
out resort to some arbitrary procedure. The fact of society 
is wider, then, than the fact of humanity. 
The question arises, therefore, whether sociology should take 
account of animal groups as well as of human groups. If we 
assume the evolution of the human from the sub-human there 
can be only one answer to this question: Sociology must take 
animal societies into account. Just as psychology cannot stop 
with the study of the human mind, but goes on to study the mani- 
festations of mental life even in the lowest animal forms in 
order to throw light upon the nature of mind; so sociology can- 
not stop with the study of human interactions, but must go on 
to study the lowest type of psychical interactions found among 
animal forms, in order to throw light upon the nature of society. 
But it must be admitted that the psychologist's interest in the 
mental life of animals is prompted by his desire to explain the 
mental life of man. So, too, the sociologist's interest in animal 
societies is prompted solely by his desire to explain human 
societies. In each case the human remains the center of interest. 
But because we believe that we cannot understand a thing unless 
we understand it in its genesis, and because we believe, further- 
more, that the origin of nearly all important elements in human 
nature is to be found below the human line, we are forced to 
study animal mental and social life in order to understand fully 
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the social life of man. Sociology is, therefore, essentially a 
human science; and its comparative chapters form but a brief 
introduction to its treatment of human problems. It would be 
substantially correct to define sociology in human terms-as the 
science of the organization and evolution of human societies, 
were it not that some sociologists have denied that sociology 
has any comparative chapters; that animal association can throw 
any light upon human association. The elementary considera- 
tions on modern scientific method which we have here intro- 
duced are sufficient to refute this position; and to establish the 
proposition that sociology, though distinctively a human science, 
must take into account at every step the facts of the animal life 
below man. 
II 
THE SUBJECT-MATTER AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY 
The subject-matter of sociology.-Considerable controversy 
has existed over the question as to whether sociology has an 
independent subject-matter or not. It is evident from our defi- 
nition of sociology, however, that its subject-matter is the same 
as that of all the social sciences. The only difference between 
the subject-matter of sociology and a special social science, like 
economics, for example, is that sociology takes the whole field 
of social phenomena for its subject-matter while economics takes 
only one section or phase of social phenomena, namely, the indus- 
trial phase. In the same way biology or physics has no distinc- 
tive subject-matter apart from the specialisms which exist under 
them. Sociology, then, like all general sciences, has no dis- 
tinctive subject-matter of its own. This is true, however, more 
or less of all sciences. The distinction between the sciences is 
not one of subject-matter, but of problems. The same subject- 
matter may be investigated by several sciences, but always from 
different points of view, that is, with reference to different prob- 
lems. Thus a movement of the human body may be investi- 
gated with reference to certain problems by the physiologist, and 
with reference to quite different problems by the psychologist. 
The truth is that there are no hard and fast lines in nature upon 
which to base the divisions between the sciences. The present 
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divisions have grown up as a result of the division of labor 
between scientific investigators and are largely matters of con- 
venience. That is, they are largely teleological divisions, based 
upon the different problems before the minds of different in- 
vestigators. 
The subject-matter of sociology is, then, social phenomena, in 
the broad sense in which that term has been defined; or as Pro- 
fessor Small has somewhat more happily phrased it, "the process 
of human association." 16 The sociologist considers this process 
as a whole, in its totality, and especially in its more fundamental 
aspects; while the students of the special social sciences study 
special phases of the same process. Thus the same objective 
social fact, say the French Revolution, may serve as scientific 
material for the sociologist, the economist, the political scientist, 
and many other investigators. 
The unit of investigation in sociology is a topic which has 
occasioned considerable discussion among sociologists. It is not 
apparent, however, that a science must have but one unit of 
investigation,'7 and the outcome of the discussion has been to 
indicate a number of units of investigation which may be used. 
Among the more important of these are: (i) the socius, or asso- 
ciated individual, the member of society, the unit out of which 
all the simpler social groups are composed: (2) the group of 
associated individuals, whether the groups are natural, genetic 
groups, or artificial, functional groups; (3) the institution, 
which we may here define as a grouping or relation of individuals 
that is accepted, usually expressly sanctioned, by a society. 
It is evident that all of these units, and many more, may be 
employed by the sociologist in investigating social organization 
and evolution. The object of the sociologist's attention is always, 
however, as Professor Hayes has demonstrated, the associational 
process, that is, the psychical interactions of individuals.18 Some 
phase of the social process is, then, always the real unit of 
sociological investigation. It may be communication, sugges- 
lo General Sociology, chap. i. 
17 Compare Ross, The Foundations of Sociology, pp. 85-99. 
18 See American Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, pp. 750-765. 
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tion, imitation, competition, co-operation, or any one of the many 
minor processes which go to make up the whole process of 
social organization and evolution. It is these processes of indi- 
vidual interaction and their many complications which the soci- 
ologist investigates and is bent on explaining. As soon as he 
shifts his attention from the interactions between individuals to 
the individual himself, he is no longer a sociologist, but a psy- 
chologist or a biologist, for the object of his attention is then 
either the states of consciousness of the individual or his physical 
characteristics. The socius can, then, be a "unit of investigation" 
in sociology only in so far as he is considered a functional element 
in the associational process. 
The problems of sociology.-Our definition of sociology has 
already indicated that the problems of sociology fall into two 
great classes: (i) problems of the organization 19 of society, and 
(2) problems of the evolution of society. 
The problems of the organization of society are problems 
of the relations of individuals to one another, and to institutions 
and of institutions to one another. Ultimately all these problems 
reduce themselves to the problem of the types of interaction 
found among the individuals of a given group at any given 
time. Specifically, such problems are, for example, the nature 
of the forces which draw and hold men together in certain forms 
of association; the various forms or modes of association; the 
influence of various elements in human nature upon the social 
order; the influence of physical factors upon the constitution of 
a society; how men act in groups or co-operate; how ideals, 
standards, public sentiment, and the like dominate the individual 
and shape social activities; in short, how all forces or influences 
'0 It must be admitted that the word "organization" is not exactly a happy 
one, since, as the problems mentioned indicate, it is meant to cover both the 
"structural" and "functional" aspects of society. If, however, it be remembered 
that in sociology we are dealing always with processes, not with fixed structures, 
it will be seen that an organization or co-ordination of processes is what is essen- 
tially involved in both the so-called structural and functional aspects of society. 
Organization, in this broad sense of social co-ordination, then, may be used to 
cover all problems of a hypothetically stationary society. 
No attempt is made in this section to give a full list of the problems with 
which sociology deals. It is attempted only to show that all the problems of pure 
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operate to give a society a certain form or arrangement at any 
given moment. The problems of social organization, then, are 
problems of a hypothetically stationary society. They are such 
problems as arise from studying society in cross-section, as it 
were, when no question as to changes in society is raised. For 
this reason Comte called the division of sociology which deals 
with such problems "social statics ;" many recent sociologists 
would prefer to call it "social structure." 
The problems of the evolution of society are problems of the 
changes in the type of social organization; that is, in the type of 
individual interactions. Under this head comes the important 
problem of the origin of society in general-that is, of psychic 
group-life-and of human society in particular. But aside from 
the problem of origin, the problems of social evolution are mainly 
two, namely, the causes of social progress, that is, advancement 
toward a higher, more complex type of social organization; and 
the causes of social decline or degeneration, that is, reversion to 
lower and simpler forms of organization. The former problem 
is, of course, the more important of the two, the latter being 
merely its negative aspect. Indeed, the problem of social progress 
is, perhaps, the central problem of sociology, the one to which all 
other problems lead up. Hence the chief purpose of sociology 
may be said to be to develop a scientific theory of social progress. 
The study of social evolution, then-that is, of the factors which 
produce social changes of all sorts, from those of fashions to 
great industrial and political revolutions-is the vital part of 
sociology. The problems of change, development, in society are 
evidently problems of movement. Hence Comte proposed that 
this division of society be called social dynamics, as "dynamics" 
in his time was the name of that part of physics which dealt with 
sociology may be classified under one of two heads: (I) social organization (in 
the broad sense explained above); (2) social evolution. A careful survey of the 
problems dealt with by modern sociologists will show that they can all readily 
be classified under one or the other of these two headings, save, perhaps, 
problems in social ethics, which, as I shall show later, do not belong in pure 
sociology. Other classifications of sociological problems are of course possible, 
and may be easily reconciled with this most fundamental classification; as e. g., 
the classification into biological problems and psychological problems. 
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the laws of motion. Recent sociologists usually call this part of 
sociology genetic sociology, or simply social evolution. 
Static and dynamic sociology.-Shall we, then, preserve the 
old distinction between static and dynamic sociology? It is 
worthy of note that even Comte, who made this distinction, said 
that he made it merely for purposes of scientific analysis, and 
that it must not be considered as involving "any real separation of 
the science into two parts." 20 The truth is that no problem in 
social organization can be deeply investigated without running 
into the problem of social evolution. We cannot study social 
structure without being led insensibly into questions of origin 
and development; on the other hand, we cannot study social evo- 
lution without considering the structure affected. Complete 
sociological theory, therefore, does not admit of division into 
static and dynamic portions. The distinction is merely one of 
problems, and arises through scientific analysis. It is a useful 
distinction in sociological investigations and for pedagogical pur- 
poses, but it cannot be maintained in a systematic presentation of 
sociological theory, as all recent sociological writers have dis- 
covered. 
Moreover, the terms "static" and "dynamic" are borrowed 
from physics, and are not particularly happy terms when used 
to describe social processes. As noted above, terms borrowed 
from the biological sciences are coming to replace these bor- 
rowed from physical science in recent sociological discussions. 
Thus social morphology is used instead of social statics, and 
genetic sociology instead of social dynamics. But it must be 
admitted that these new terms are scarcely more happy than 
those borrowed from physical science; indeed, in some respects 
they fail to convey the meaning as clearly as the older terms. 
There is, after all, little in names, provided they are used with 
clear and definite connotations. The adjectives "static" and 
"dynamic" are often convenient in the social sciences, and there 
can be no good objection to their use, since they have been 
adopted into the vocabulary of nearly all the sciences. We shall 
continue to speak of the "static" and "dynamic" aspects of soci- 
20 Positive Philosophy, Book VI, chap. iii. 
This content downloaded from 080.082.077.083 on March 01, 2018 20:07:12 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
SOCIOLOGY: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS RELATIONS 3I5 
ology, therefore, without implying, on the one hand, any separa- 
tion of the science into two parts, and, on the other hand, any 
close analogy between physical and social conditions and changes. 
The relation of sociology to social description.-Some sociolo- 
gists have created another division of sociology which they term 
descriptive sociology, made up of descriptions of social activities 
and institutions. It is true that all science presupposes descrip- 
tive material. Thus political science presupposes the description 
of actual government, economics the description of commerce 
and industry, biology the descriptive material which we term 
natural history. But it is true also that mere description is never 
science. Science, in the strict sense, is always explanatory, it is 
a higher generalization, revealing laws, causes, and principles. 
As Professor Small says, "Like all genuine science, sociology is 
not interested in facts as such. It is interested only in relations, 
meanings, valuations, in which facts reappear in essentials." 21 
Moreover, another difficulty in creating a descriptive division 
in sociology, which shall be recognized, is the fact that the field 
of social description is already covered by three well-recognized 
departments of knowledge, namely, ethnography, demography, 
and history; ethnography describing the savage, barbarous, and 
semi-civilized peoples; demography, describing the contempo- 
raneous societies of civilized peoples; and history describing the 
past events among the civilized. It has been somewhat of a puzzle 
which of these three, descriptive sociology should be identified 
with. Mr. Spencer, in a famnous passage,22 identified descriptive 
sociology with history-as it ought to be written. Most other 
sociologists have tended to identify it with demography; while 
some have not hesitated to assume that the only social description 
worthy of attention by the sociologist was to be found in ethnog- 
raphy. It is evident, however, that the descriptive material 
which the sociologist must make use of is to be found in all three 
of the above disciplines. 
It would seem that the best way out of the difficulty is to 
drop the use of the term "descriptive sociology," just as we do 
21 General Sociology, p. I5. 
22 Study of Sociology, Preface to American edition, p. iv. 
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not speak of a "descriptive biology." Its use only adds to the 
confusion already existing as to the relation of sociolgy to the 
above three disciplines. There can be no objection, however, to 
using the term to designate special organizations of descriptive 
material from the above sources for sociological purposes. This, 
in effect, is what Mr. Spencer attempted to do in his vast work 
entitled Descriptive Sociology. 
III 
THE RELATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO OTHER SCIENCES 
THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 
The relation of sociology to the special social sciences, eco- 
nomics, politics, ethics, and the like, has been often compared to 
the relation of a trunk of a tree to the branches. Perhaps, as 
Professor Ross has suggested, the tree in question should be 
thought of as a banyan tree,23 as many of these sciences have 
independent roots in psychology and biology. All of these 
sciences, however, derive their significance from the fact that 
they deal with some phase of human interactions; and they are, 
therefore, properly styled the special social sciences. The eco- 
nomics, the morality, the religion of a perfectly isolated being, if 
such could be thought of, would be something far different from 
the things we know under those names in human society. As 
was said above, the special social sciences deal with special phases 
or aspects of the social life; and they do this by a process of 
scientific abstraction, that is, by studying these phases as more or 
less separate, or abstracted, from the total social life. They are 
all, therefore, in a certain sense one-sided sciences of society; 
while sociology, dealing as it does with the total social reality, 
must be thought of as the all-sided science of society. 
The relation of sociology to the other social sciences, how- 
ever, is a purely logical relation, and can be fully described only 
in logical terms. It is the relation of the general to the special. 
The special social sciences, as the name implies, deal with prob- 
lems which are relatively specific and concrete, concerning only 
23 Foundations of Sociology, p. 27. 
This content downloaded from 080.082.077.083 on March 01, 2018 20:07:12 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
SOCIOLOGY: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS RELATIONS 317 
one section or aspect of the social process. Their generalizations 
are, therefore, relatively partial and incomplete. Sociology, on 
the other hand, tries to reach generalizations of a higher order, 
and to present a general or complete view of the social reality. 
The social problems which are of a general natture, therefore, 
that is, those which pertain to the social process as a whole, are 
left by the special social sciences to sociology. What these prob- 
lems are has already been pointed out. 
Moreover, the special social sciences are not logically com- 
petent to deal with these general social problems, as their basis 
of induction is not sufficiently wide. In the past, this fact has 
not always been sufficiently appreciated by workers in the special 
social sciences, and the result has been many one-sided theories 
of the social life. Thus an economist in constructing a theory of 
social progress would naturally give undue prominence to eco- 
nomic factors, and perhaps even subordinate other factors alto- 
gether. This Karl Marx and other students of economic con- 
ditions have actually done. It was, in part, as a protest against 
such "fractional" views of the social life that sociology came into 
existence. The special social sciences, when pursued by them- 
selves, necessarily furnish only fractional views of the social life- 
process; they must find their logical completion, therefore, in a 
general science of society which shall furnish a complete view of 
social organization and evolution. 
The relation of sociology to the special social sciences may, 
perhaps, be illustrated by the relation of general philosophy, as a 
scientia scientiarum, to all the sciences. Modern philosophy is 
not indifferent to the sciences, but is, in one sense, to be regarded 
as a result of the synthesis of all of them. The several sciences, 
dealing as they do each with but narrow segments of reality, 
necessarily present but partial views of the universe; to philosophy 
is left the task of combining these partial views into a complete 
and ultimate picture of the universal reality. To philosophy, 
therefore, are left the ultimate and universal problems, such as 
the nature of mind and matter, the ultimate relations between 
these two, the nature of causation, etc. In this sense, the relation 
of philosophy to the several sciences is similar to the relation of 
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sociology to the special social sciences. The matter might be 
further illustrated by considering the relation of any general 
science to the special sciences under it. Thus biology may be con- 
sidered a synthesis of all the biological sciences, and to it are 
turned over the general problems of organic life, such as the 
origin and evolution of species, the nature of nutrition and 
reproduction, the causes of variation, the theory of heredity, 
and the like. While these illustrations are imperfect, it is mani- 
fest that the relation of sociology to the special social sciences 
must be of the same general character as the relation of any 
general science to the special sciences under it. 
There has been some debate as to whether sociology should 
be regarded as a synthesis of the special social sciences or as a 
science fundamental to these. The question could have arisen 
only through confusion of the logical relations between prob- 
lems. All the general sciences are at the same time synthetic in 
method and fundamental in character. Their fundamental 
character is wholly a result of the wideness of their syntheses. 
Their generalizations are not only much wider than those at- 
tempted by the special sciences, but, because they are wider, they 
are also much deeper. Now, sociology, as we have said, attempts 
generalizations much wider than the special social sciences; and 
for that very reason its generalizations are of a fundamental 
character. But it is only through the synthesis-the seeing 
together-of all social phenomena that such fundamental generali- 
zations can be effected. Hence, sociology is correctly conceived 
as a result of the synthesis of the special social sciences. At the 
same time it is well to remember that we mean by this, not a 
summing-up of the special social sciences, but rather an all- 
sided generalization of the social process. Hence, sociology is 
the fundamental science of the social life, the basis of the social 
sciences as well as their logical completion. 
It must be evident from all that has been said that the practi- 
cal relations between students of sociology and students of the 
special social sciences should be those of sympathetic and helpful 
co-operation. The sociologist needs to know at every point in 
his work the results of the special social sciences, and, on the 
This content downloaded from 080.082.077.083 on March 01, 2018 20:07:12 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
SOCIOLOGY: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS RELATIONS 3I9 
other hand, in order that he may have a proper point of view, a 
proper perspective, the worker in the special social sciences must 
be well grounded in sociology. 
The dangers of isolation of the special social sciences from 
sociology and of sociology from these sciences are very grave 
dangers. Overspecialization in any one social science must be 
discouraged if one-sided views of social reality are not to prevail. 
Human life is a unity, and it must be studied in all of its aspects, 
on all of its sides, if a true conception of it is to be attained. 
Accordingly we shall emphasize the close interdependence of the 
several social sciences with sociology and of sociology with these 
sciences in discussing the relations of sociology with each of them. 
We shall now note briefly the more important of these sciences 
and the close interrelations between them and sociology. 
i. Economics.-First among the special social sciences must 
be placed economics. This is primary among them because it deals 
with that phase of the social life which is concerned with the 
production and distribution of the material means of subsistence. 
To be more exact, it is "the science of those social phenomena 
to which the wealth-getting and wealth-using activity of man 
gives rise;24 or in the language of another authority, it "treats 
of the commercial and industrial activities of men from the 
standpoint of values and markets." 25 It is evident, whichever of 
these definitions one adopts, that economics deals with a most 
fundamental phase of man's activity as a social being-the prob- 
lems connected with the production and distribution of wealth. 
Its importance, therefore, in understanding the total social life, 
to the sociologist, cannot be too highly estimated. 
On the other hand, economics, more than any other social 
science, has been guilty of claiming for itself more of the total 
field of social science than it is justly entitled to. Some econo- 
mists have even attempted to make it a general science of the 
organization and evolution of society as a whole. These unjusti- 
fiable extensions of economics have been due, in part, to loose 
and careless definitions, as when it is defined as "the science of 
2- Ely, Oustlines of Economics, p. 82. 
25 Davenport, Outlines of Economic Theory, p. 2. 
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values," or "the science of the mind as utilizing." 26 Such terms 
as "value" and "utilization," it is only necessary to remark, are 
much broader than the economic sphere, and their use in defi- 
nition leads to a confusion and haziness as to the problems of 
the science. More often, however, the unjustifiable extensions of 
economics have been due to the assumption that the economic 
activities of man, because of their primary character, determine 
all his other activities. The fallacy of this assumption lies in 
assuming that what is primitive, or rather what manifests itself 
primitively, contains all the factors of future development. The 
resulting view of social organization and evolution as exclusively 
determined by economic factors is, of course, exceedingly one- 
sided and untrue to the reality. All of this argues the impor- 
tance of sociology, as a science of social first principles, for eco- 
nomics as well as for the other social sciences; in brief, that 
economics must be grounded upon sociology. The economist, 
indeed, can less afford to dispense with the guidance which the 
sociological view-point can give him than the sociologist can 
afford to dispense with the knowledge of facts and principles 
which economics can furnish. Sociology is indispensable for eco- 
nomics, and economics is indispensable for sociology, if both are 
to attain the character of realistic science. 
2. Political science and jurisprudence.-Among the oldest of 
the social sciences is the science of politics or government. It 
was first systematized by Aristotle, and down to the modern era 
may be said to have been almost the sole recognized representa- 
tive of the social sciences.27 Its relations with sociology are most 
intimate. The state is the most visible manifestation of social 
organization; it is the most imposing, if not the most important, 
social institution. Hence it is of direct concern to the sociologist. 
Still there is little excuse for regarding sociology as simply an 
enlarged political science, or for thinking, on the other hand, 
that political science" will be absorbed by sociology. Political 
science deals with that aspect or phase of man's social life which 
26 Sherwood, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, September, I897. 
27 Previous to the nineteenth century ethics was not recognized as a social 
science. 
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is manifest in government. While the phenomenon of authority 
or control is universal in all human groups, political science deals 
only with the organized authority, manifest in the state, which 
we call government. Among its chief problems are the origin, 
nature, forms, and functions of government, the nature and 
location of sovereignty, and methods of administration. 
An important branch of political science is jurisprudence. 
This is the science of law. Its problems are the nature, genesis, 
and historical development of law. In its comparative portions 
it brings together many facts concerning the customs and insti- 
tutions of different peoples, which makes it closely akin to 
sociology. 
It is evident, then, that political science and jurisprudence 
are both closely related to sociology. Government and law are 
two of the most important aspects of human social organization 
and evolution; and they cannot be understood without under- 
standing the principles which underlie all social organization and 
evolution. On the other hand, these aspects of the human social 
process, because of their importance, present problems of their 
own, and there can be no doubt that they are legitimate fields 
for independent special sciences. But they will achieve their best 
development, and sociology will achieve its best development by 
a recognition of mutual interdependence. 
3. The science of religion.-By the science of religion is 
meant, not theology, a metaphysical inquiry into the nature and 
attributes of God; but a study of the actual phenomena of 
religious belief and practice among men. An important section is 
called comparative religion. Its problems are the origin, nature, 
forms, and functions of both religious beliefs and religious prac- 
tices. To superficial thought, religion seems to be wholly an 
individual matter. But close study has shown that nothing is so 
inextricably interwoven with the social life of man as religion. 
Not only are the forms of religious belief and practice frequently 
an outcome of a particular social organization or stage of social 
evolution; but every type of civilization seems to rest upon a 
particular form of religious belief. Religious phenomena are, 
then, social phenomena, and the science of religion is a social 
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scienace, though like all the other social sciences it has independent 
roots in psychology. It is as yet in a comparatively undeveloped 
and unsystematized condition and its development must come 
through establishing it definitely upon a sociological basis. On 
the other hand, sociology needs the enrichment which will come 
from a scientific study of religious phenomena fron1 the social 
point of view. 
4. Ethics.-The relations of ethics to sociology need careful 
consideration, as those relations are more complex than in the 
cases of the sciences which we have just considered. Ethics is 
a science of norms and ideals; it is concerned with the right or 
wrong of human conduct, and its problem is what ought to be 
in human life. There can be no doubt that ethics is a social 
science, since its problems are those of human interaction. On 
this account some eminent sociologists have considered it to be 
merely a part of sociology. This was the earlier position of 
Comte, who at first gave no place to ethics among the sciences. 
Later in life, however, he recognized the relatively independent 
position of ethics as a science. On the other hand, there have 
been many ethical thinkers who have seen in sociology nothing 
but an extension of ethics. Ethics, they say, has a right to 
inquire into all phases of human relationships in order to deter- 
mine the principles of right and wrong, and in their opinion, 
sociology is simply such an inquiry. 
Here we have the old familiar situation. One group of 
thinkers maintaining that a special social science (in this case 
ethics) has no right to exist because its field can be covered by 
sociology; and another group maintaining that sociology has no 
right to exist because its field can be covered by other sciences 
(in this case, ethics). As in all of these cases we shall find 
reasons for pronouncing both of these extreme views radically 
wrong. Ethics cannot be reduced to a mere chapter in sociology, 
because its problems are sufficiently distinct and important to 
constitute it a relatively independent science. Nor can so,ciology 
be regarded as a mere extension of ethics, because its problems 
are not only distinct from, but fundamental to, those of ethics. 
Yet it is impossible to separate ethics from sociology or 
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sociology from ethics in any hard and fast way. It is impossible 
to study the various types of social organization without indi- 
cating the superiority and inferiority of the various types; or to 
study social evolution without indicating advantageous and dis- 
advantageous adjustments, tendencies toward social survival or 
social extinction. In general, it is impossible for the human 
mind to study social conditions without perceiving maladjustments 
or possible economies not realized; or to formulate a theory of 
human progress without implications of social obligation. This 
is not saying that sociology is ethics or ethics sociology; but it is 
saying that a system of ethics grows spontaneously out of a sys- 
tem of sociology; and that the attempt to exclude all ethical 
implications and judgments from sociology is not only futile and 
childish, but undesirable. It is the business of sociology to fur- 
nish a foundation for ethics; hence it is desirable to recognize in 
sociology ethical implications. And such will be frankly the 
practice of this book. 
On the other hand, ethics cannot discuss the ideal for human 
life, whether individual or social, without taking into account 
actual social conditions. If it is to be a science of "the good for 
man," it must build up its conception of the good out of the tend- 
encies and potencies of actual human society. Moreover, there 
can be no application of ethical principles to actual human life 
without involving again a consideration of the principles of social 
organization and evolution. All this is equivalent to saying that 
scientific ethics must be founded upon sociology. But this is 
not saying that ethics does not rest, though less immediately, 
like all the other social sciences, upon psychology; nor is it deny- 
ing that ethics has metaphysical projections, which are, however, 
in our opinion, of more interest to the metaphysician than to the 
ethicist proper. 
What, then, is the exact relation of ethics to sociology? Be- 
fore finally answering this question it will be well to recall that 
ethics is a normative science, that is, a science of values and 
ideals. In character, then, it is midway between a pure science 
and an applied science. All the social sciences, however, may be 
said to have implicit normative aspects, sociology being the gen- 
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eral science which furnishes the basis for the synthesis of their 
implied norms and ideals. Now ethics takes these norms and 
ideals and develops them and synthetizes them. Ethics, in its 
widest sense, is, therefore, the normative aspect of the social 
sciences. In its narrowest sense, as the principles of right con- 
duct for the individual, ethics may be regarded as the synthesis 
of the normative aspects of sociology, psychology, and biology. 
But inasmuch as the sociological comprehends the psychological 
and biological, it would be sufficiently accurate to say that 
individual ethics is the normative aspect of sociology, looked at 
from the individual point of view, while social ethics would be 
the normative aspect of sociology, looked at from the collective 
point of view.28 The various special branches of social ethics, 
such as political ethics, industrial ethics, and the like, of course 
rest especially upon the corresponding social sciences. 
Scientific ethics, then, presupposes a scientific sociology, as 
Professor Small and others have clearly shown,29 and in large 
measure the development of the one must await the development 
of the other. The independence of ethics from sociology as a 
science, as in the case of all the other social sciences, is a matter 
of methodological expediency, of the division of labor, not of 
difference of subject-matter. The various social sciences cannot 
explain what is and what has been in human society without 
showing, at least by implication, what must be if human progress 
continues, that is, what ought to be. On the other hand, these 
sciences are not complete until their normative implications have 
been developed and harmonized by a general science of ethics; 
in other words, they find their completion in ethics. The rela- 
tions between ethics and the other social sciences are, then, rela- 
tions of mutual interdependence, and this is especially true of 
the relations of ethics and sociology. The scientific moralist and 
' It is doubtful whether there should be any division of ethics into individual 
and social, since every ethical questi6n has both its individual and social aspects. 
But these terms have come into common usage, and it seems best to indicate that 
they came from looking at the same body of principles from different points of 
view (individual and collective). 
2I Small, The Significance of Sociology for Ethics; also General Sociology. 
pp. 674-96. 
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the sociologist should, therefore, work hand in hand, for they 
are both working at the great problem of human welfare, the 
one directly, the other indirectly. 
5. Education.-The science of education, or pedagogy, as it 
used to be called, is an applied science. On the one side it is con- 
cerned with the development of the latent powers and capacities 
of the individual; on the other with the adjustment of the indi- 
vidual to society, the initiation of the individual into the social 
life. The science of education thus has two sides-one psy- 
chological and the other sociological; in other words, it is an 
application of psychology and sociology. The psychological 
aspects of educational science have been sufficiently emphasized, 
but it is only recently that its sociological aspects have begun to 
receive attention. It must be evident, however, that if educa- 
tion may be regarded from one point of view, as the fitting of the 
individual for full and complete membership in the social life, 
it should proceed with full consciousness of what the needs and 
requirements of the social life are. There can be no such thing 
as a scientific educational program without an understanding of 
the first principles of the social life. 
Moreover, education should be not simply the development 
and adjustment of the individual; it should aid in social evolution, 
regenerate society, by fitting the individual for a higher type of 
social life than that at present achieved. And to do this requires 
an insight into the principles of social evolution as well as an 
understanding of human nature. The science of education rests, 
therefore, equally upon sociology and psychology. The educator 
who would use the educational system as a means of social 
progress should have a profound knowledge of the principles of 
social organization and evolution; and even the humblest teacher 
who comes to his task equipped with such knowledge would find 
a significance and meaning in his work which he could hardly 
otherwise obtain. 
6. The applied social sciences. Many sociologists speak of an 
"applied sociology ;" but it is doubtful if there is such a 
discipline, or division of sociology. Rather, sociology, like most 
of the general sciences, serves as a basis, not for one, but for 
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many, applied sciences. Thus biology is the basis for those 
applied sciences which are grouped together under the term "the 
medical sciences." It is also largely the basis of the applied 
sciences of agriculture and horticulture. But we hardly ever 
speak of "applied biology." There is scarcely more propriety in 
speaking of applied sociology, though the term might be justified, 
(i) as a name for such an organization of the principles of 
sociology as will show their practical bearing upon human life, 
which is the sense in which Dr. Ward uses it ;30 or (2) as a name 
for an organization of all our knowledge of practical means and 
methods of improving social conditions, for which Professor 
Henderson has proposed the name of "social technology." 31 
In our opinion, however, it would be better if the term "applied 
sociology" were dropped altogether. 
Besides education, among the more important applied social 
sciences are philanthropy, social economy, and social politics. 
The best organized of these is philanthropy, or charitology, as it 
is sometimes called. This deals with the abnormal classes in 
society, that is, the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes, 
their genesis, social treatment, and prevention. It has numerous 
subdivisions, one of the most important being penology, which 
deals with the social treatment of the criminal class. The 
science of philanthropy is perhaps the best developed of any of 
the special social sciences, resting as it does immediately upon a 
practical art; and, in its broadest sense, it has good grounds for 
claiming to be the applied department of sociology. However 
this question may be decided, it is evident that the relation of 
the science of philanthropy to sociology is very similar to the 
relation of the science of medicine to biology. The tendency to 
develop a science of philanthropy apart from sociology, is, there- 
fore, to be regretted; and the tendency of some sociologists to 
ignore the work being done in the field of scientific philanthropy 
is equally regrettable. Just as many valuable contributions to 
biology have come through the development of medical science 
80 In his Applied Sociology. 
31 Henderson, "The Scope of Social Technology," American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. VI, pp. 465-86. 
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and art; and just as the development of biology has reacted to 
deepen and broaden medical science; so similar results can be 
expected from the close co-operation of the sociologist and the 
scientific social-worker. 
Social economy is an ill-defined term which has lately been 
used to cover the whole field of social betterment, and so as 
synonymous with philanthropy in the widest sense. Strictly, 
however, it should be applied only to the betterment of economic 
conditions, that is, to industrial betterment. In this sense, it may 
be regarded as an application of sociology and economics to a 
particular phase of the social life. Social politics is a term 
loosely used to designate the science and art of bettering social 
conditions through the agency of the state or government. It 
may be regarded as an application of sociology and political 
science. 
However the various applied social sciences may be defined, 
it is evident that they overlap; that they are closely related to 
sociology and the other social sciences, and that they are of 
interest to the sociologist. 
TIIE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO HISTORY 
There remains to be considered the relations of sociology to 
one other body of knowledge which concerns human society, 
and that is history. Personally, I prefer not to call history a 
science, although it uses scientific methods; it is rather descrip- 
tive material preliminary to science, which is a higher generaliza- 
tion of facts into laws and principles. As we have already seen, 
some sociologists, notably Spencer, would make history synony- 
mous with descriptive sociology. We are now speaking, of 
course, of written history, history in the subjective sense. But 
to understand the relations of sociology to history in this sense, 
one must first understand the relation of sociology to objective 
history. 
Objective history is simply that which actually occurs in 
human societies; it is the procession of events in the entire life 
of humanity. History, in this sense, is evidently but a convenient 
name for the whole movement of human societies from the 
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beginning of human life up to the present. Sociology, on its 
genetic side, is concerned with the constant factors in that move- 
ment, the laws or principles of social evolution. Objective 
history, if we include in it present social phenomena, is, there- 
fore, the subject-matter of sociology; and in this sense, sociology 
is the science of history.32 But objective history is not only the 
subject-matter of sociology; in its various phases it furnishes the 
subject-matter for all the social sciences. It is also the subject- 
matter of that preliminary organization of knowledge which 
we term written history, or historiography. 
The relation of sociology to historiography.-Historiography, 
or history, in the subjective sense (the sense in which the term 
is ordinarily used) is the description or narration of past events 
in the life of humanity. It is the mental picture of some portion 
of the human past which we are enabled to form by means of 
documents and other remains. The knowledge of past social 
phenomena which we get from history is particularly dependent 
upon documentary evidence. It is, therefore, only a partial pic- 
ture of the past, more or less accurate according to the character 
and abundance of this documentary evidence. Moreover, because 
it rests chiefly upon the evidence of written records, history, as 
a body of knowledge, is limited to what is known as "the historic 
period" in the life of humanity. Thus it furnishes no knowledge 
of a most important stage of social evolution, the period before 
written records began, during which social institutions were 
slowly forming and the foundations of culture being laid. To 
reconstruct this period the sociologist has to turn to the descrip- 
tions of the life of present savage and barbarous peoples fur- 
nished him by ethnography. 
Again, because the method of history is the indirect method 
of investigating, that is, by means of documentary evidence, 
rather than the direct method of observation, it rarely includes 
descriptions of present society. For his knowledge of present 
social phenomena the sociologist has to turn to demography, 
various collections of descriptive and statistical material concern- 
ing present societies, besides, of course, making use of his own 
32 Cf. Flint, Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum, p. 334. 
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powers of personal observation. But this knowledge of present 
social phenomena is of primary importance in a scientific inter- 
pretation of society, in accordance with the general principle that 
the scientific value of a fact decreases in proportion to its 
remoteness from the observer. 
Thus history, as a body of knowledge, falls far short of 
furnishing a complete presentation of the subject-matter of 
sociology. It fails to furnish knowledge of the facts of the 
earlier stages of social evolution; and it also fails to furnish 
knowledge of the facts of present social life. In studying social 
evolution, or the evolution of any particular institution, there- 
fore, the sociologist must turn to ethnography and demog- 
raphy as well as to history. For example, the sociology 
of the family cannot be constructed from the knowledge which 
written history affords. All the earlier stages of the evolution 
of the family as an institution can only be made out by recourse 
to ethnography, while the latest stages, the present tendencies of 
the family, can be discovered only by recourse to demographical 
and statistical material relating to present society. 
Moreover, history, as it is usually written, has certain short- 
comings from the scientific standpoint which still further limit 
its utility to the sociologist. Perhaps the worst of these is the 
predominance of the literary over the scientific spirit in the 
presentation of its subject-matter. This leads to the story-telling 
type of historical narrative, and to overemphasis of the dramatic 
elements in the life of societies. Now, the essence of the dra- 
matic lies in the personal and individual; hence the literary his- 
torian crowds his narrative with striking personalities and per- 
sonal incidents, neglecting not only the less obvious psychical and 
physical influences at work in the social process, but also the 
commonplace, recurrent events of the social life. Undoubtedly 
the personal and the particular have a legitimate place in his- 
torical narrative; for without their proper emphasis history could 
not give a true picture of the social reality; but their overempha- 
sis serves to obscure the real and deep undercurrents in the social 
life which chiefly determine its course. The literary method of 
presenting historical facts is, therefore, subversive of scientific 
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ends; the story-telling interest is opposed to the scientific interest. 
Consequently, the sociologist can look to the literary historian for 
but little help. 
In a similar way the exclusive attention of the historian to 
one or only a few aspects of the social life serves to distort the 
picture of the social reality. Thus much of the history written 
down to the present has been political history, the history of the 
state or government. This has been, perhaps, helpful to the 
political scientist, but it has been insufficient to reveal for the 
sociologist the forces at work in social organization and evolu- 
tion. Political history, and in general, one-sided history of all 
kinds, falls far short of making that exhibit of all phases of a 
people's life which alone is a sufficiently wide basis for induction 
for the sociologist. 
Although written history furnishes but a part of the facts with 
which the sociologist deals, nevertheless the co-operation between 
the sociologist and the scientific historian-the historian who 
employs scientific methods and who aims at the faithful repre- 
sentation of the social reality-should be of the closest sort. 
They are both working in the same field and to a large extent 
have the same aim. The sociologist needs scientific history. He 
cannot complete his inventory of the social world without its aid. 
Moreover, sociology cannot content itselg, as one author has well 
remarked, with being merely illustrated psychology; it must also 
be, at least in its final development, analyzed and compared 
history.33 Finally, the historical method of study is of supreme 
importance to the sociologist, and this fact alone makes a scientific 
history of all ages and peoples perhaps the greatest desideratum 
of the sociologist. On the other hand, the scientific historian 
has need of sociology. Without some knowledge of the prin- 
ciples of social organization and social evolution he can scarcely 
obtain a proper perspective of his facts; nor can he rightly 
interpret his facts or explain the causes of social changes without 
reference to such principles. The scientific historian could do 
his work more scientifically if he had a critical knowledge of 
sociological laws and principles. We conclude, then, both that 
3 BougIe, Revue internationale de sociologie, March, I904. 
This content downloaded from 080.082.077.083 on March 01, 2018 20:07:12 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
SOCIOLOGY: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS RELATIONS 33I 
scientific history is necessary to the sociologist, and that sociology 
is equally necessary to the scientific historian. 
The relation of sociology to the philosophy of history.- 
In the eighteenth century there grew up a body of speculative 
thought about human progress known as the philosophy of 
history. Among the founders of this discipline were Vico, 
Herder, and Condorcet. The attempt of these men and their 
successors was to find certain laws or principles which underlie 
historical phenomena and which would explain human progress. 
It is evident that the problem which the philosophers of history 
undertook to solve is the same as one of the main problems of 
sociology, namely, the problem of social evolution, or of progress. 
The method of the philosophers of history was, however, entirely 
different from that of the modern sociologist. In the first place, 
their method was speculative rather than scientific. For the most 
part they deduced their theories of progress from metaphysical 
assumptions rather than built them up out of the facts of history. 
In the second place, the philosophers of history usually sought 
some one all-pervading principle, which would be "a key to 
history," and which would explain everything in the historical 
movement; while the modern sociologist seeks not some abstract 
universal principle which will explain everything, but the psy- 
chological factors at work in producing social changes. It is not 
too much to say that sociology is the modern scientific successor 
of the philosophy of history. 
Dr. Paul Barth, of the University of Leipzig, has claimed 
that sociology is identical with a scientific philosophy of history.34 
But sociology includes the structural as well as the genetic study 
of societies. A scientific philosophy of history would be at most 
a genetic explanation of the historical movement-that is, a 
theory of social evolution. It is only by stretching the term 
philosophy of history beyond what it logically connotes, that 
it could be made to include all of sociology. As Comte clearly 
indicated, a scientific philosophy of history would coincide merely 
with genetic or dynamic sociology. It would, however, be better 
to drop the name philosophy of history altogether, both on 
'Barth, Die Philosophiie der Geschichte als Sociologie, pp. 4-I3. 
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account of its past unfortunate associations, and because the two 
aspects of sociological theory-the theory of social organization 
and the theory of social evolution-are now seen to be in- 
separable. 
A word should be said in conclusion about the relation of the 
philosophical historian to the sociologist. The philosophical 
historian is one who is not content with the mere faithful 
description or narration of past events, but seeks to interpret 
them, and in some degree to unify them, through the light of 
general principles. In this interpretation, the older philosophical 
historians made use chiefly of metaphysical assumptions, such 
as fate, providence, and the like; but the modern philosophical 
historian makes use chiefly of psychological principles. He 
offers a psychological interpretation of social movements. He 
is, therefore, very close to the sociologist. Indeed he may 
be said to be a sociologist rather than a historian, to the 
extent that he makes use of general principles in order to 
interpret history. If his work is rightly done, it becomes a sort 
of illustrated sociology, and is of great value to the sociologist in 
the narrow sense. This type of historian, the sociological his- 
torian, we might call him, is becoming increasingly common, and 
from the sociological standpoint should be welcomed as a valu- 
able auxiliary worker in the field of the social sciences. 
THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO BIOLOGY 
It is now necessary to examine the relation of sociology to 
other general sciences. The other general sciences, usually recog- 
nized as antecedent to sociology, are mathematics, physics, chem- 
istry, biology, and psychology. Upon all of these sociology is 
more or less dependent, but particularly upon biology and psy- 
chology, as these sciences deal with the phenomena of life. 
We must first consider the relation of sociology to biology. 
Biology is the general science of life. In its broad sense it is 
inclusive of all the special biological sciences, such as zoology, 
botany, physiology, anatomy, embryology, and the like. In its 
narrow sense, it is a science fundamental to these dealing with 
certain general problems of life, such as cell structure, heredity, 
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variation, natural selection, and organic evolution. In both of 
these senses it is evident that biology bears a close relation to 
sociology. The phenomena of association are phenomena of life; 
the general laws of biology, therefore, must hold in sociology. 
More specifically, the laws which govern the bodily activity of 
the individual (i. e., physiology) must be understood in order 
to interpret scientifically the interaction of individuals. 
Of course, certain sections of biological science are much 
more closely related to sociology than others. Thus physical 
anthropology, which has been happily defined as "the zo6logy 
of man," has many important bearings upon sociology while 
general biology, furnishing us with the laws of organic evolu- 
tion, must be regarded as one of the foundation sciences of 
sociology. 
Biology, however, usually limits itself to a consideration of 
the physical aspects of life, passing on to psychology, in the 
scientific division of labor, the consideration of the mental 
aspects. For this reason some have claimed that biology is not 
directly related to sociology, but only indirectly through psy- 
chology. In other words, they claim that all the phenomena of 
society are psychical, and that all the problems of the social life 
are psychological. This view is incorrect only because it is 
extreme. As we have already seen, society is constituted by the 
psychical interaction of individuals; but this does not preclude 
the existence of interactions between individuals which are pre- 
dominantly physical, as, e. g., in reproduction. Thus it comes 
about that there are some social problems which are largely 
biological. Among these problems are the laws of the growth 
of population (birth and death rate), the social influence of 
heredity (degeneration and eugenesis), and the influence of 
natural selection upon social evolution. Not only are these 
problems included in sociology, but their solution is an indispen- 
sable step in framing any theory of social organization and evo- 
lution. We must conclude, therefore, that sociology rests in part 
directly upon biology. Indeed, whether such problems as' those 
just mentioned are treated in sociology or biology, is simply a 
matter of the scientific division of labor. They have always 
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been considered social problems, however, and will doubtless 
continue to occupy the attention of social investigators. 
But inasmuch as the vast majority of social problems are in 
the main psychological, the relation of sociology to biology is 
chiefly indirect. Biology furnishes the background for both 
psychology and sociology in giving them the laws of organic life. 
Human society, we may well repeat, is but a phase of organic 
life; and the laws of all life must apply to the social life of man. 
The biological sciences, then, dealing with the physical aspects 
of the life-process, are the preliminary foundation of all the 
social sciences, even though the latter rest more immediately 
upon psychology. 
THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO PSYCHOLOGY 
As we have just said, psychology is the immediate basis of all 
the social sciences, since the interactions between the individuals 
of a group are mainly psychical; that is, they are processes which 
involve consciousness; or, as the psychologists would say, they 
are mediated by consciousness. In plainer language, nearly all 
of the interactions between individuals are interactions of thought, 
feeling, and will. Now, psychology is the science of conscious- 
ness, or of the mental life.35 A somewhat more elaborate defi- 
nition would be that psychology is the science of the forms and 
methods of experience. Now, consciousness, experience, is an 
individual matter; hence psychology is, in effect, a science of 
individual human nature. It investigates the consciousness of 
the individual to discover the forms and methods of his experi- 
ence. And as the individual is alone a center of experience, it 
would seem that psychology, if defined as the science of immedi- 
ate experience,36 or consciousness, must be limited to the indi- 
vidual. 
Still, it must be admitted, there is nothing in the nature of 
things to prevent the psychologist from going on to investigate 
the laws of individual interaction, the forms or modes of associa- 
tion, and the evolution of social organization. Some psycholo- 
35James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. i; also' Angell, Psychology, p. I. 
83 See Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, p. 3. 
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gists have done so; but there are practical reasons which prevent 
the majority from doing so, similar to the practical reasons 
which prevent the physicist from taking up the problems of 
chemistry. The psychologists' own problems of the forms and 
methods of the mental life in the individual are so vast that 
practically they have no time left to investigate the interrelations 
of individuals. Hence, sociology is a practical necessity as a 
matter of the scientific division of labor. The psychologist, 
therefore, turns over to the sociologist the principles of individual 
human nature which he has discovered; and these the sociologist 
uses to interpret the interactions, combinations, and progressive 
organization of individuals. 
The distinction, then, between sociology and psychology is 
the same as that between all other sciences-it is fundamentally 
a distinction of problems. The problems of the psychologist are 
those of consciousness, of the individual mind, as we commonly 
say; while the problems of the sociologist are those of the inter- 
action of individuals and the evolution of social organization. 
To put it in other language, the distinction between sociology and 
psychology is one of point of view. The psychological point of 
view is the individual and his experiences; the sociological point 
of view is the social group and its organization. Whatever, 
then, aims at explaining the psychical nature of the individual is 
psychological; while whatever aims at explaining the nature of 
society is sociological. 
From the point of view which we have given, sociology pre- 
sents itself as mainly an application of psychology to the inter- 
pretation of social phenomena. Indeed, from this standpoint, all 
the social sciences become psychological disciplines. This is not 
saying, however, that the psychology worked out in the laboratory 
or found in the textbook may be readily and easily applied to 
explain all social phenomena. The method of the social sciences 
is not so simple as that. History and the daily life around us 
afford psychological principles of interpretation quite as impor- 
tant as any offered us by the texts. Statistics reveal great tend- 
encies of human nature which laboratory methods would never 
suffice to discover. Nevertheless, a -mastery of psychology, no 
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matter whether the knowledge is gained from daily life, from 
textbooks, or from the laboratory, is essential to the sociologist. 
Though all sciences contribute of their principles for the inter- 
pretation of human life, which the sociologist attempts, yet 
because of the psychological nature of his subject-matter (social 
phenomena) psychology contributes more than all of the rest. 
Equipment in psychology is, therefore, absolutely indispensable 
for the sociologist. If it is true, as has been recently declared, 
that "no one is a psychologist unless he is a biologist," 37 it is 
even more true that "no one is a sociologist unless he is a psy- 
chologist." 
THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
In recent years there has grown up a discipline known as 
social or collective psychology. What, then, is the relation of 
this science to sociology? If what has been said is correct, it is 
evident that sociology is mainly a psychology of the associa- 
tional process. Now, this is usually exactly what is meant by 
social psychology. Social psychology is, therefore, the Mnajor 
part of sociology. This has been recognized by many sociolo- 
gists, as, for example, Ward, who speaks of "that collective 
psychology which constitutes so nearly the whole of sociology." 38 
But social psychology is not the whole of sociology, as some 
have claimed; for sociology has, as has been already pointed out, 
also important biological aspects. 
It must be noted, however, that the term "social psychology" 
is often loosely used to designate, not only the psychology of the 
associational process, but the genesis of the so-called social states 
of mind of the individual. In this latter case social psychology 
is evidently a section of the genetic psychology of the individual. 
Though very important for the sociologist, it would be better to 
recognize, for the sake of clearness, that this sort of social psy- 
chology is a part of individual psychology. With social 
psychology in this sense we have at present nothing to do. 
In the former sense, social psychology is simply an applica- 
"Hall, Adolescence, Vol. II, p. 55. 
" Pure Sociology, p. 59. 
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tion of the principles of psychology to the interpretation of social 
phenomena. But this is what we said sociology mainly is. Con- 
cerning the identity of social psychology with the larger part of 
sociology, then, there can be no doubt. They have the same 
problems and the same point of view; and the distinction between 
sciences is, as we have repeatedly said, a distinction of problems. 
The aim of social psychology is to give a psychological theory of 
social organization and evolution. It may be, therefore, best de- 
fined as the psychological aspect of sociology. A more accurate 
name for social psychology would be, then, "psychological 
sociology." 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY AND BIOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY 
The content of sociology is, then, the biology and the 
psychology of the associational process (i. e., of human inter- 
actions). Every social problem, every problem of human inter- 
relations, is resolvable into psychological and biological elements, 
and may be approached from either side. Just as sociology has 
its static and dynamic aspects, so it has its biological and psycho- 
logical aspects; and just as it has been found that the static and 
dynamic aspects cannot be kept separate in complete sociological 
theory, so it will be found that in a complete theory of social 
organization and evolution the biological and psychological 
factors must be harmonized. Social biology and social psy- 
chology, so-called, are simply different ways of attacking the 
same problem. They have the same problems, and they constitute 
one unified science-sociology.39 
Biological sociology, dealing mainly with the influence of 
natural selection upon social evolution, with the social effects of 
heredity, and with the principles of population, may, however, be 
regarded as a foundation for the more important part of socio- 
logical theory-the psychological part. Though far from being 
"This does not, of course, reduce sociology to mere biology and psychology, 
any more than physiology is reduced to mere physics and chemistry by saying 
that it is essentially a physics and chemistry of organic processes. Every science 
derives its principles of interpretation from the sciences immediately beneath it. 
Besides, since every social problem has both biological and psychological aspects 
the science of sociology remains a unity, not portions of two sciences. 
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completely systematized, it is so much better worked out that it 
may well be taken for granted in developing a psychological 
theory of social organization and evolution. Accordingly this 
book will deal directly only with the psychological aspects of 
sociology. 
IV 
THE RELATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY 
SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
Sociology was the last, historically, of the great sciences to 
be differentiated from philosophy. For a long time prior to the 
definite organization of sociology as a science there existed a body 
of speculative thought about human society which was known as 
social philosophy. This older social philosophy is related to 
sociology much as the older natural philosophy is related to 
modern physics and chemistry. It had the same problems as 
sociology-the origin, nature, and processes of development of 
human society. It differed from scientific sociology mainly in 
its methods, which were almost wholly speculative, or a priori. 
Of course, sociology in its more general aspects still remains a 
philosophy of society. 
Philosophy is no longer to be sharply separated from science. 
On the contrary, all modern philosophy is scientific in its spirit 
and methods, in that it has its beginnings in the established 
results of the special sciences, and in that it bases speculation 
upon the empirical study of reality. In a generic sense, philoso- 
phy is a term often used to designate the more general and specu- 
lative aspects of all the sciences. It is entirely right, therefore, to 
speak of sociology as both a science and a philosophy. 
In the stricter sense, however, the word philosophy has now 
two generally accepted meanings. First, it is used as a general 
term for all the so-called philosophical disciplines, such as psy- 
chology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics. Secondly, it is 
used in a narrower sense as synonymous with metaphysics, 
including in that term epistemology as well as cosmology and 
ontology. We have already discussed the relations of sociology 
to ethics and psychology. It remains only to consider the rela- 
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tion of sociology to philosophy in the narrow sense, that is, to 
metaphysics. Before doing this, however, we should like to point 
out that sociology as a general science has much in common with 
the so-called philosophical disciplines. Like them, it deals mainly 
with mental phenomena. Like them, also, it employs the method 
of generalization-of speculative inference from facts-to a 
greater degree than the sciences of physical nature. Two general 
conclusions may be drawn from what has been said. The first is 
that sociology itself may be regarded as a philosophical disci- 
pline, quite as much as psychology, though this is not inconsistent 
with maintaining at the same time that it is a natural science. The 
second is that the study of other philosophical disciplines, and 
especially training in philosophical methods of reasoning, will be 
found of great help to the student of sociology. 
SOCIOLOGY AND NATURAL SCIENCE 
Sociology is a natural science in the sense that it studies 
definite processes in real space and time. Like physics and 
biology, sociology does not question the reality of its subject- 
matter. It may be that there is no such thing as the interaction 
of individuals, as one mind acting upon another mind; but this 
is a postulate which sociology refuses to question. Its attitude 
toward its subject-matter-the social process-is the naive uncriti- 
cal attitude which all the natural sciences assume toward their 
subject-matter. It starts with the common-sense view of the 
world, assuming the existence of real individuals, who are both 
physical and psychical beings, and who are in mutual interaction 
with one another. 
Again, like all natural sciences, sociology aims only at answer- 
ing the question, "how?" "in what way?" It traces the coexist- 
ences and sequences among social phenomena, showing the 
method, or technique, of the processes involved. Beyond this it 
does not go. It does not attempt to give the what or the why of 
the social life. The what, or objective content, belongs to the 
descriptive sciences, history and demography. The why, or the 
subjective meaning of the social life, belongs to philosophy and 
religion. Though sociology may throw light upon such problems, 
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as a natural science it makes rno attempt to penetrate into the ulti- 
mate nature and meaning of things. 
The term "natural science" is, we must note, however, some- 
times used as synonymous with physical science. In this sense, 
of course, sociology is not a natural science. Despite the fact that 
it has certain biological aspects, it is properly placed among the 
psychical sciences. It is, then, a natural science only in the same 
sense in which psychology is a natural science. 
THE RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO METAPHYSICS 
The natural science point of view saves the sociologist from 
settling beforehand many troublesome metaphysical problems. 
It excludes metaphysical problems from sociology, though it does 
not, of course, exclude metaphysical implications; for these are 
found in all sciences and in every view of the world. Meta- 
physics, as Professor James has said, means only an unusually 
obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently about the uni- 
versal reality.40 It deals with the ultimate problems of reality 
and of knowledge. It takes the established results of the special 
sciences, criticizes and harmonizes them, so as to present an ulti- 
mate view of reality. In this modern sense metaphysics is not 
non-scientific in character; it is rather a science of the sciences, a 
clearing-house of the sciences. It is as presumptuous, however, 
and unscientific for the sociologist as such to attempt to settle 
metaphysical problems as it would be for a physicist to deal with 
sociological problems; and it is a reversal of scientific method to 
attempt to build a system of sociology upon some shadowy 
hypothesis as to the ultimate nature of reality. 
While sociology must keep to the natural-science point of 
view, it is better to recognize frankly, however, the metaphysical 
elements in many of its problems. These words are necessary; 
for most sociologists have kicked metaphysics out of the front 
door, but have ended by lugging it in again through some back 
door. They have rejected as unscientific the idealistic view of 
the world, but have accepted as scientific the materialistic view. 
Now, materialism is just as much a metaphysical theory as ideal- 
40Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 461 
This content downloaded from 080.082.077.083 on March 01, 2018 20:07:12 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
SOCIOLOGY: ITS PROBLEMS AND ITS RELATIONS 34I 
ism, and the sociologist as such has no more right to assume the 
one theory than the other at the outset of his investigations. He 
is not called upon to assume anything as to the ultimate nature of 
reality; but like all scientific investigators, he should start with 
the naive view of the world. It is true that this naive view has a 
great deal of metaphysics implied in it; but it does not pretend 
to be a definite theory of the nature of reality, and is, therefore, 
merely provisional, subject to correction and revision in the court 
of last resort-metaphysics itself. Thus the sociologist has no 
right to assume that mind can be derived from matter and motion, 
nor that matter and motion can be derived from mind; but he 
must accept as a fact the existence of physical and psychical 
phenomena alongside of each other with no discoverable way of 
deriving either one from the other. Again the sociolgist must not 
assume that all is necessity in the universe; but he must accept the 
existence of that relative freedom of individual action which 
consciousness seems, at least, directly to testify to, until investi- 
gation proves the contrary. 
The sociologist is, perhaps, more excusable for getting en- 
tangled in metaphysical problems than any other scientist; for he 
deals with both the bodies and the minds of men, with physical 
necessity and free choice; in a word, with human beings in all 
their complexity and with their interactions. Certain metaphysical 
problems inevitably obtrude themselves in his investigations. 
The more important of these are, (i) the relations of mind and 
matter; (2) the freedom of the individual will; (3) the exist- 
ence of immutable laws in social phenomena. In each of these 
problems it is so important that the sociologist should preserve 
a neutral attitude that we shall consider briefly some of the con- 
ditions of each problem. 
i. The relations of mind and matter.-The naive view of 
the world sees in mind and matter two interacting elements, each 
relatively independent of the other, but each a factor in a com- 
plex, unified whole. According to this view, mind may act upon 
and modify matter; while physical facts act upon and condition 
mental facts. As opposed to this view materialism asserts that 
physical facts (matter and motion) are, in the last analysis, 
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alone determinative of all processes; that mind is a derivative of 
these; and that we are, from an a-posteriori view, automatons. 
Again, idealism asserts that the physical universe is a mental con- 
struct, and has no existence independent of some perceiving sub- 
ject. Without going farther into metaphysical theories of the 
relations of mind and matter, it is evident that for the sociolo- 
gist to assume either of the above theories in his investigation 
and reasoning is for him to shut his eyes to half of his facts. The 
sociologist has nothing to gain, and much to lose, through his 
assuming either that the mind cannot modify and control physical 
forces, or that physical forces do not modify and condition mind. 
Through assuming either hypothesis he surrenders the uncritical 
point of view of natural science and becomes a metaphysician. 
And he reverses the true method of all science when he attempts 
to build a science upon a metaphysical theory. It is preposterous, 
therefore, for a man to offer to the world a view of human society 
embedded in his metaphysical philosophy as scientific sociology. 
It may be a valuable contribution to sociological thought, but it 
is not scientific sociology, because it has abandoned the method 
of science. 
2. The freedom of the individual will.-Has the individual 
a limited freedom in his deliberate actions (that is, is any one 
of several courses of action open to him), or is this freedom an 
illusion? This is a metaphysical problem which has puzzled the 
wisest minds. The general impression is that science pronounces 
in favor of the latter view-that freedom is an illusion, that we 
are really automatons-but this is an erroneous impression. 
Necessitarianism, or determinism, as it is usually called, is purely 
a metaphysical theory. It is the view that everything in the 
world is mechanically predetermined by forces acting from behind 
(by a vis a tergo). Freedomism, on the other hand, is the doc- 
trine that human actions may be determined teleologically, that is, 
by purposes or foresight of ends. It is almost unnecessary to 
point out that necessitarianism is based upon a mechanical view 
of the world, and that historically this theory has been prevalent 
in proportion as the mechanical view of the world, which is more 
or less based upon the physical sciences, has been dominant. 
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Determination of activities by purposes or foresight of ends has 
been called teleological or inner necessity; but this is exactly 
what is meant by freedom; and it is hard to see how this is 
identical with physical or mechanical necessity. The fact is that 
mechanical necessity is the only necessity known to science; and 
this conception has been built up exclusively within the physical 
sciences, and purely for practical reasons. To carry over such a 
conception from the physical sciences and apply it dogmatically 
to all phases of human life is, therefore, an unwarrantable piece 
of metaphysical assumption. 
It is not necessary, then, for the sociologist to take sides on 
this metaphysical question; and it is especially not necessary for 
him to view human society as a theater of physical necessity. 
It is the business of the sociologist to trace uniformities in social 
phenomena without reference to any metaphysical theory of 
human action, explaining them as determined, now by forces 
acting from behind, and now (when it is more reasonable to do 
so) by intelligible motives and foresight of ends. 
3. The existence of laws in social phenomena.-Are there 
"eternal iron laws" in social phenomena as in the physical world? 
This question would be at once answered in the negative if we 
assumed that the human individual has a relative freedom; or if 
strict metaphysical neutrality be maintained no position regarding 
it need be taken. The question is, however, methodologically 
even more important than the other two which we have just 
discussed. It is said that if there are no laws in social phenomena, 
there can be no social science; that science is a causal explanation 
of phenomena through reference to laws; that a sociology with- 
out laws is not a science. 
That there is some truth in these assertions we have already 
practically admitted by frequently using the word "laws" in 
discussing the problems of sociology. The real methodological 
problem is, however, In what sense shall the word "law" be used 
in the social sciences? Shall it be used to imply the metaphysical 
theory of necessitarianism, that is, that the concept of mechanical 
necessity can be made to cover all phases of human life? Or, 
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shall "law" be used in a broader sense, without implying any sup- 
port to any metaphysical theory? 
In deciding in what sense the word "law" shall be used in 
sociology, it is first necessary to call the attention of the student 
to nearly synonymous words. The words "truth," "truism," 
"rule," "generalization," "uniformity," "regularity," and "princi- 
ple," are all often loosely used as more or less nearly synonymous 
with the word "law." But it is important that they be discrimi- 
nated from one another, for the word "law" has become 
peculiarly specialized. Without stopping to define all of the above 
terms it must be said at once that most, if not all, of the so-called 
laws in the social sciences belong to one of the above categories- 
that is, they are generalizations, uniformities, or principles, rather 
than laws in the sense in which the physical sciences would use 
that word. Thus Comte's famous Law of the Three States is 
only a generalization; while the so-called law of least effort (that 
the greatest gain is always sought for the least effort) is really a 
psychological principle. Now exactness in the use of terms is 
desirable in science; hence it is important that we inquire the exact 
meaning which the word "law" has acquired in the older sciences 
-the physical sciences. At first in the physical sciences law 
meant the manifestation of an outer force, controlling the action 
of things. But as the passive view of nature came to be given up, 
it came to mean merely the uniform way in which things occur. 
Later, under the influence of the growth of the mechanical view 
of nature, law came to mean a fixed, unchanging, and so neces- 
sary relation between forces. The concept of a law of nature 
thus became deeply tinged with the idea of physical necessity. 
Indeed, in the physical sciences, it became synonymous with 
physical necessity. Hence the expression "eternal iron laws," 
embodying the idea that nature is a theater of mechanical 
necessities. 
Now it is the carrying over of this idea which has grown up 
in the physical sciences to the social sciences which we have called 
metaphysical. This can only be done by assuming that the sub- 
ject-matter of the social sciences is homogeneous with the subject- 
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matter of the physical sciences, as Comte assumed; but this, at 
present, is an entirely gratuitous metaphysical assumption. 
In order to prove that "eternal iron laws" exist in social phe- 
noniena as in physical phenomena we should have to prove, (i) 
that physical necessity rules in human affairs; (2) that stimulus 
and response are equal to cause and effect. As regards the 
first proposition, we have already said that it is a mere gratuitous 
assumption, and is not capable of proof. As regards the second 
proposition, it must be said that psychology teaches that stimulus 
and response are something quite different from cause and 
effect,4' thotugh the popular mind and even sociologists often 
assume the contrary. And as psychology is fundamental to soci- 
ology, its verdict must be accepted as final by the sociologist. 
In scientific language a "cause" has come to mean the invari- 
able, necessary, and equivalent antecedent of a consequent which 
we call "the effect." Now, the "stimulus" in psychology is not 
the equivalent of the "cause," but rather the opportunity for the 
discharge of energy; and the "response" is not the mechanical 
effect of the stimulus, but is always teleological, that is, directed 
to some end. Hence it is incorrect in the strict language of 
science, to speak of a stimulus as the cause of a response, or of a 
bodily state as the cause of a mental state. But the connections 
between individuals in society are almost entirely those of stimu- 
lus and response. Men influence each other, act upon each other, 
though acting as stimuli to each other. Hence there are no direct 
causal connections between individuals in society; or, to be more 
exact, there are no direct causal connections between the minds 
of individuals. 
The interaction between individuals which constitutes society, 
then, is upon the plane of stimulus and response rather than upon 
the plane of cause and effect. This is one of the first truths 
which the beginner in sociology needs to learn. One of the 
ignes fatui of sociologists has been to trace causal connections 
among social phenomena. But it is well to remember that the 
causal connections between individuals are mainly indirect, 
through their relation to a common physical environment, and 
'See, e. g., Titchener, Outline of Psychology, p. 343. 
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only direct in the case of heredity. Just as psychology has been 
obliged for the most part to interpret the mental processes of the 
individual in terms of stimulus and response, so sociology will for 
a long time to come have to content itself with an interpretation 
of social processes in terms of stimulus and response.42 Now, 
what we have said answers the question whether there are laws 
in sociology in the same sense in which there are laws in the 
physical sciences. The laws of physical science are laws of cause 
and effect in the strict sense of those terms. No such laws are 
possible in social phenomena. 
But are there no laws at all in sociology? There is no objec- 
tion to using the word "law" in the social sciences, provided we 
do not carry with it all the implications which it has come to 
have in the physical sciences. By a "law" in the social sciences 
we can only mean a regular or uniform way in which things 
occur. In other words, we go back to the older and more gen- 
eral meaning of the word "law," meaning by it simply a uni- 
formity or regularity among phenomena. Even though we grant 
that human freedom is not an illusion, and that the mental pro- 
cesses of individuals and the processes of society do not illustrate 
cause and effect in the strict sense of those terms, still it does not 
follow that human nature is haphazard and that society is with- 
out regularities. On the contrary, human nature is remarkably 
uniform, and the interactions of individuals exhibit surprising 
regularities. But the uniformities of human nature and society 
'Of course, there is no objection to using the words "cause" and "effect" 
in the social sciences in the broad sense of stimulus and response, provided that 
this is recognized. Under such circumstances, we could speak of the "cause" 
of a social occurrence, meaning its psychical motivation, not its mechanical cause. 
Several sociologists have recognized that the word "cause" cannot be used in the 
social sciences in the same sense in which it is used in the physical sciences. 
Thus Ross says (Foundations of Sociology, p. 55), "the causes, i. e., the motiva- 
tion of [social] occurrences ;" and again (p. 8o), "the ultimate cause of a social 
manifestation must be motive or something that can affect motive." That is, the 
ultimate "cause" of a social phenomenon is something psychical-something 
that influences will. But as we have already pointed out, this is not cause and 
effect in the strict sense. These terms if used, therefore, in sociology, like the 
term "law," will have to be used in a wider sense than that given them in the 
physical sciences. For the sake of clearness it would be often better to use the 
terms stimulus and response. 
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are due to habits, that is, teleological adaptations rather than 
mechanical necessities. The habits of action of individuals- 
using that phrase in its broadest sense, to cover the inborn tend- 
encies and characteristics of human nature as well as acquired 
habits-give rise, then, to regularities in social phenomena (the 
interactions of individuals) almost as invariable as those which 
characterize physical nature. This is what makes the social 
sciences possible. Law in 'the social sciences, then, rests upon the 
fact of habit. We arrive, therefore, at this definition of a social 
or sociological law: A social law is a statement of the habitual 
way in which individuals, or groups of individuals, interact. 
But it may be said that these habitual ways of interacting 
among individuals are not invariable, and that therefore there 
can be no sciences of social phenomena. It may be granted that 
the social sciences can never become exact sciences like the 
physical sciences. But it does not follow from this that they are 
not trustworthy bodies of scientific knowledge, capable of afford- 
ing guidance in all the practical affairs of life. A slight degree 
of inexactness does not invalidate scientific knowledge because 
science deals with large masses of facts and general situations. 
Thus if certain exceptions are found to some social law-like 
Professor Giddings' law of sympathy, that the degree of sym- 
pathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases43- 
it does not invalidate that law for the purposes of the sociologist, 
because ninety-nine times out of a hundred he can count on its 
working. 
Again, it is not true that science consists chiefly of laws, unless 
that word is used in a very broad sense. A science consists 
equally, at least, of principles. Principles are fundamental truths, 
which generally explain the ways of working of certain forces or 
agencies; while laws are more superficial formulations of the 
observed uniformities of the resulting phenomena. In physical 
science principles explain by referring phenomena to mechanical 
cause and effect, action and reaction. But in the social sciences, 
the agent, man, acts teleologically; hence social phenomena must 
be explained in teleological terms. Thus it is quite as scientific 
"Elements of Sociology, p. 67; also Inductive Sociology, p. io8. 
This content downloaded from 080.082.077.083 on March 01, 2018 20:07:12 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
348 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 
to explain human actions in terms of habit, adaptation, purpose, 
stimulus, and response as it is to explain physical phenomena in 
terms of cause and effect. This is only saying, in effect, that 
sociology is a psychological science; but it is not of course, saying 
that sociology is a metaphysical science. 
To sum up: It is not the business of the sociologist to settle 
metaphysical problems, nor has he any right to assume, at the 
present time, that they are settled. It is rather his business upon 
the basis of a common-sense view of the world, to trace uniformi- 
ties among social phenomena so far as he can, and to explain 
social processes in terms of mental activity, that is, in terms of 
stimulus and response. Only thus can sociology escape from the 
barren wastes of fruitless, metaphysical discussion; and only 
thus can it make its own proper contribution to that ultimate 
world-view to which general philosophy seeks to attain. 
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